This paper uses the perfect market segmentation setting in China's stock market to compare the information content of the stock trades of domestic and foreign investors. We study 76 firms that issue both A-shares (for domestic investors) and B-shares (for foreign investors) and compare the price discovery role of the two segmented markets in China. Before Feb 19, 2001, the A-share market led the B-share market in price discovery, as the signed volume and quote revision of the A-share market had strong predictive ability for B-share quote returns, but not vice versa. After Feb 19, 2001, because some domestic investors were allowed to invest in the B-share market, we find evidence for a reverse causality from the B-share to the A-share market. Nevertheless, the [Hasbrouck (1995) 
Introduction
Are foreign investors more or less informed relative to domestic investors? This has been one of the most frequently researched topics in the international finance literature. According to Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) and Seasholes (2000) , as a result of better access to expertise and talent, foreign investors, who are mostly institutional investors, should be smarter than local investors. In the Finnish stock market, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) found that foreigners buy more stocks that perform better in the next 120 trading days than do individual domestic investors. Seasholes (2000) also found that foreign investors buy (sell) ahead of good (bad) earnings announcements in Taiwan. In these empirical works, the short-term price performances of trades by foreign versus domestic investors are typically compared. Based on data on institutional equity flows, Froot and Ramadorai (2001) found that foreign purchases predict not only prices in foreign markets, but also prices of closed-end country funds, indicating that foreigners have better information than do local investors.
There are, however, a few studies that have provided counter evidence to show that domestic investors are better informed. For example, Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2000) analyze trade data from Korea and Hau (2001) studies data from Germany and documents that individual domestic investors have a short-lived private information advantage on individual stocks over foreign investors. Dvorak (2005) uses transaction data from Indonesia and shows that domestic investors gain higher profits than do foreign investors. He finds that clients of global brokerages have higher long-term and lower medium-(intramonth) and short-(intraday) term profits than do clients of local brokerages. This suggests that clients of local brokerages have a short-lived information advantage, but that clients of global brokerages are better at choosing long-term winners.
In this paper, we propose to study the informational advantage of domestic investors relative to foreign investors in China's stock market by inferring information transmission from the dynamic relationship among intraday returns and order flows in the markets for these two classes of investors.
1 A unique feature of China's stock market is that the A-share market (for domestic investors) and the B-share market (for foreign investors) were completely segmented before Feb 19, 2001 . Therefore, we can investigate directly which market had more price discovery by drawing from the information transmission process between the two markets.
foreign investors are equally informed. Second, our results should not be interpreted as necessarily disadvantaging one type of investor relative to the other. The reason is that although the two markets are segmented, their prices are transparent and can be observed in real time. Therefore, even if foreign investors are less informed, they can infer from the A-share prices almost instantaneously and update their information when trading in the B-share market.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the market structure of China's stock market. Section 3 develops the empirical methodology for investigating the hypothesized relationships and derives empirical predictions. Section 4 describes the data and provides summary statistics. Section 5 presents empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Structures of China's A-and B-share markets
China's two stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), were established in November 1990 and July 1991, respectively. Two types of shares are traded on the SZSE and the SHSE. A-shares are denominated in Chinese RMB and can be purchased only by domestic investors. B-shares are denominated in either US dollars (SHSE) or HK dollars (SZSE), and could be purchased only by overseas investors prior to Feb 19, 2001 . By the end of December 2001, a total of 1,160 A-and B-share stocks were listed on both stock exchanges with a total market capitalization of RMB 4,352.22 billion (or US$ 525.75 billion). Of these, 1,048 were A-shares for domestic investors and 112 were B-shares for foreign investors, with 88 listed companies issuing both A-and B-shares.
Because A-and B-shares are issued to two different types of investors, the A-and B-share markets were fully segmented. After Feb 19, 2001 , the government implemented a new policy by opening the B-share market to individual domestic investors with foreign currency holdings. As a result, the A-and B-share markets are now no longer completely segmented. But because the RMB is not fully convertible, Chinese citizens still cannot freely buy foreign currencies to purchase B-shares, which means that there currently remains a certain degree of segmentation between the two markets. 3 The trading system for the SZSE and the SHSE is based on the electronic consolidated open limit order book (COLOB). The trading hours for both the SZSE and SHSE are from 9:30 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. and from 1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. The market opening is based on a call auction that operates from 9:15a.m. to 9:25a.m., followed by a continuous auction after 9:30a.m. After the lunch break, the market reopens in the afternoon directly with a continuous auction without the consolidated auction. The minimum tick sizes are 1 cent (RMB 0.01 Yuan) for A-shares on both exchanges, US$ 0.002 (US$ 0.001) for B-shares on the SHSE before (after) Jan 1, 2001, and HK$ 0.01 for B-shares in SZSE.
An important feature of the listed companies in China's stock market is that the ownership structure is divided into negotiable publicly owned shares and non-negotiable state-owned or corporation-owned (legal person) shares, which comprises about twothirds of all outstanding shares. The negotiable publicly owned shares include A-shares, B-shares, H-shares (listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange) and N-shares (listed on the New York Stock Exchange). The non-negotiable shares include state-owned shares, which are shares held by the government through a designated government agency and legal person shares (i.e., domestic and overseas economic entities but not individuals). These shares are illiquid and are traded off-exchange at a substantial discount relative to the net asset value per share.
Methodology and empirical predictions
We use three methodologies to trace whether domestic investors are better informed than are domestic investors: (1) an extended VAR for multiple markets, (2) a VECM to explicitly model a potential cointegrating relation between A-and B-share prices and to calculate the Hasbrouck (1995) information shares, and (3) an event analysis based on large order imbalance intervals.
Extended VAR for multiple markets
We follow Hasbrouck (1991) in modeling the dynamic relationship among trades and quotes in the A-and B-share markets. Hasbrouck proposes a bivariate VAR model of the trades and quote revisions for an individual stock to measure the information content of stock trades:
where r t is the quote return at transaction time t, which is the change in the bid-ask midpoint from the quotes following transaction tÀ1 to the quotes following transaction t, and z t is the signed volume (positive if buyer-initiated, negative if seller-initiated) of transaction t. It is assumed that the disturbances in the two equations have zero means and are jointly and serially uncorrelated. In the model, there is a presumption of causality running from both contemporaneous and lagged trades to quote revisions and in reverse only from lagged quote revisions to trades. We extend Hasbrouck's model to multiple markets. Suppose a company i issues A-and B-shares. We define r i;t ¼ ½r represent the signed volume in the respective markets during time interval t. The time interval is five minutes, ten minutes or 15 minutes. Allowing for individual firm effects, we use the panel data to model the dynamic relationship among the trades and quote revisions in two markets as follows:
where a i ¼ ½a
are firm dummies capturing the firmspecific features, a 1 , yy, a p , b 0 , b 1 , yy, b p , c 1 , yy, c p , d 1 , yy, d p are (2 Â 2) matrices of coefficients, while e 1i,t and e 2i,t are (2 Â 1) vectors of disturbance terms. Based on this system of equations, we determine, for example, whether trades in the A-share market contain information and cause quote revision in the B-share market after controlling for trades in the B-share market and lagged quote revisions in the two markets.
A key hypothesis is that the price discovery takes place predominately in the A-share (domestic investor) market relative to the B-share (foreign investor) market. We conjecture that prior to Feb 19, 2001 , when domestic investors could trade only on the A-share market and foreign investors could trade only on the B-share market, private information was discovered predominantly in the A-share market. Therefore, we predict that the A-share returns led the B-share returns more than vice versa. After Feb 19, 2001 , since some domestic investors (with foreign currency holdings) began to trade on the B-share market, we expect that the B-share returns began to lead the A-share returns.
In general, the price impact of trades comes from both liquidity and information effects. If the price impact stems only from the liquidity effect, it is temporary and should be confined to the market where the trades appear and it will not spill over to the other market. Therefore, the signed volume in A-shares will trigger price changes in the A-share market but not in the B-share market, while the signed volume in B-shares will trigger price changes in the B-share market and not in the A-share market. On the other hand, if the price impact stems from the information effect, it is permanent and will spill over to the other market. If, for example, informed trades occurred mostly in the A-share market prior to Feb 19, 2001 , a positive (negative) signed volume in A-shares would be accompanied by price increases (decreases) in both the A-and B-share markets. On the other hand, if informed trades also occurred in the B-share market after Feb 19, 2001, a positive (negative) signed volume in B-shares would be accompanied by price increases (decreases) in both markets.
Besides the price impact, the information effect might also predict the lead-lag relationship between the signed volume in both markets. Suppose we hypothesize that before Feb 19, 2001 , trades by domestic investors in the A-share market conveyed information to foreign investors. If some foreign investors in the B-share market reacted to the A-share market trading activity faster than other investors, they would buy (sell) more in the B-share market when they observed a positive (negative) signed volume. In that case, the signed volume in the A-share market would also lead the signed volume in the B-share market.
4 But, after Feb 19, 2001 , because information is discovered in both markets, the signed volume in both markets is positively correlated with the lagged signed volume of the other market.
Hasbrouck (1995) information shares
Another methodology to establish how much a market contributes to price discovery when a security is traded in multiple markets is the cointegration analysis developed by Hasbrouck (1995) . In this framework, the price differential across markets is stationary to eliminate the arbitrage opportunity. In a statistical sense, all prices in the system are nonstationary, but cointegrated as they share one common stochastic trend-the (unobserved) efficient price process. However, we need to be careful in implementing this methodology, as cointegration is not guaranteed for our price series, in particular for the time period
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However, if foreign investors in the B-share market react to the trading activity in the A-share market immediately, then B-share prices will adjust instantaneously so that no foreign investor will find it profitable to trade on that piece of information. (prior to Feb 19, 2001 ) when both markets were fully segmented. 5 Because the market price of risk is likely to differ across markets, this could drive a wedge between the two price series. In the implementation, we first test for cointegration by an augmented DickeyFuller test on the price differential across markets. If markets are cointegrated, as detected by the rejection of a unit root in the price differential series, we estimate the VECM model suggested by Hasbrouck (1995) : 
is a diagonal matrix with the vector v on the diagonal, the other terms are as defined earlier. The information share of a market is then determined by a Cholesky decomposition of the variance matrix of the permanent price change, which is detailed in Hasbrouck (1995) . We hypothesize that if A-and B-price series are cointegrated, quote changes in the A-share market have the highest information share.
Analysis based on large-order imbalance events
In addition to the analysis based on regular trading, we follow Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2000) and focus on price discovery around unusual trading events, i.e., disproportionate order imbalances. We first condition on those five-minute intervals with highest absolute order imbalance in the A-share market and study immediate and cumulative A-and B-share returns for an event window that includes ten five-minute intervals before and after the event. This allows us to study the impact of large A-share buying or selling on A-share prices and, more importantly, on B-share prices. We then condition on five-minute intervals with disproportionate B-share imbalances and conduct a similar analysis with a special focus on the impact on A-share (cumulative) returns. We conduct these analyses before and after domestic investors are allowed to buy B-shares (Feb 19, 2001 ). Our hypothesis is that A-share order imbalance events affect B-share prices to a much larger degree than vice versa.
Data and preliminary statistics
Sample
The analysis is based on the real-time data disseminated to the traders' terminals at the SZSE and the SHSE. Our database includes all transactions data for A-and B-shares listed on the SZSE and the SHSE, including the best three bid and ask quotes, transaction prices and volumes for each trade.
The sample period is from Jan 10, 2000 to Nov 8, 2001 . To examine the impact of the policy change of allowing domestic investors to trade on the B-share market, we partition our sample into two sub-periods: one before Feb 19, 2001 and one after. We limit the sample firms to those that have both A-and B-shares listed throughout the sample period. Altogether, we have 76 listed companies in the sample, with 38 listed on the SHSE and the other 38 listed on the SZSE.
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5 Arbitrage, in this case, is hard as A-and B-shares are not exchangeable and short positions are forbidden.
To avoid price irregularities during the opening and closing periods, we exclude the first and last 15-minute intervals in the morning and afternoon trading sessions in the analysis. All trades and quotes during the rest of the trading periods are included in the sample. However, we impose several filters to remove data errors. First, trades and quotes with negative values are removed. Second, since there is a price limit of 10%, a trade that deviates in price by more than 10% from the previous trade is eliminated.
6 Third, stale quotes, which are identified as quotes with zero depth, are removed. Fourth, trades with a zero price or zero volume are eliminated. Finally, if a stock reaches the price limit so that transactions are only allowed to take place within the limit bands, observations for that stock on that particular day are excluded.
For each trade, we determine whether it is buyer-initiated or seller-initiated. The sign of a trade is established based on the algorithm proposed in Lee and Ready (1991) , where we compare the current trade price with the previous quote. The trade is classified as buyer-(seller-) initiated if the trade price is at the ask (bid) price. If the trade price lies within the spread, we record the trade as buyer (seller) initiated if the trade price is closer to the ask (bid) price. If the trade occurs exactly at the midpoint, we employ a tick test by comparing the trade price with the preceding trade price(s). A trade is classified as buyer (seller) initiated if it occurs on an uptick (downtick) or a zero uptick (downtick). When a trade occurs on consecutive zero ticks, it is not classified. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the A-and B-shares in the two sub-periods. We report the number of trading days, daily number of trades, average trade size and average daily trading volume. Prior to Feb 19, 2001 , the daily average number of trades of the A-share market was 248, which is 7.1 times that of the B-share market. The average daily trading volume of the A-share market was 2.45 times larger than that of the B-share market. This indicates that A-shares were much more actively traded than were B-shares. However, the average trade size in the A-share market was much smaller, at 35.6% of the average trade size in the B-share market.
Summary statistics
Since Feb 19, 2001 , the trading activity on the B-share market increased substantially. The daily average number of trades in the A-and B-share markets has been 173 and 153, respectively. Since that time, the average daily trading volume in the A-share market has been only 37.4% of that in the B-share market, while the average trade size of A-shares has been roughly 32.8% of that of B-shares. The percentages of buyer-initiated and sellerinitiated trades of A-and B-shares remain basically the same before and after Feb 19, 2001 .
The minimum tick sizes are 1 cent (RMB 0.01 Yuan) for A-shares on both exchanges, US$ 0.002 (US$ 0.001) for B-shares on the SHSE before (after) Jan 1, 2001, and HK$ 0.01 for B-shares on the SZSE. When expressed in RMB, the tick size for B-shares in Shanghai was roughly 2 cents before Jan 1, 2001. Because of the large tick size in the B-share market, informed investors might be constrained from trading there, causing the B-share market to react to information slower than the A-share market would. However, Table 1 shows that the average bid-ask spread for B-shares on the SHSE was US$ 0.0035 before Jan 1, 2001, indicating that the bid-ask spread is usually much larger than the tick size and therefore the tick size is not a binding constraint. Therefore, if we determine that the A-shares lead the
The price limit is 5% for the special treatment stocks.
K. Chan et al. / Journal of Financial Markets 10 (2007) B-shares in information discovery, this is not entirely due to the different tick sizes of the two markets. Table 2 presents the percentages of non-trading intervals for A-and B-shares. Before Feb 19, 2001, the percentages of non-trading intervals for A-shares were 6.4%, 3.7%, and 3.1%, respectively, based on 5-minute, 10-minute and 15-minute intervals, while the percentages for B-shares were 57.9%, 41.8% and 33.2% for the same intervals. After Feb 19, 2001 , while the percentages of the non-trading intervals for A-shares remain similar, the percentages for B-shares decrease substantially to 13.1%, 6.3%, and 4.4%, respectively. This is consistent with the conjecture that the new policy implemented on Feb 19, 2001 attracted domestic investors to the B-share market so that the B-share market became more active than before the policy change.
Empirical results
Extended VAR for multiple markets
Regression results based on 5-minute returns
We discard the first and last 15-minute in both the morning and afternoon sessions and partition the remaining trading hours (9:45a.m.-11:15a.m. in the morning session and 1:15p.m.-2:45p.m. in the afternoon session) into 5-minute intervals. For both A-and B-shares, we generate 5-minute return series using the last bid and ask quotes in each interval. If no quote is available for a time interval, we use the bid-ask quote from the previous interval. The return is calculated as the log of the ratio of quote midpoints in successive intervals. We also calculate the signed volume (the difference between the buyerinitiated and seller-initiated volume) in each 5-minute interval for both A-and B-shares. In order to control for the cross-sectional variations across different stocks, we follow Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) and standardize the return and signed volume variables. For each trading day, we first calculate the mean and standard deviation for a variable. The variable is then standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. All observations for each sub-period are pooled together for the regression analysis to increase the power of the tests. We estimate the multivariate VAR model in Eqs. (3) and (4). Since the returns and signed volumes are standardized, we can assume that the disturbances are homoskedastic. Furthermore, as we include lagged values of the dependent variables on the right-hand side to capture serial dependency effects, the disturbances are serially uncorrelated. We allow contemporaneous correlation in residual returns and residual signed volumes across the markets. However, the correlation between residuals of returns and signed volumes should be close to zero as returns are orthogonalized with respect to the signed volume in Eq. (3). We choose the contemporaneous term (if applicable) and six lags for each explanatory variable and find that using more lags does not affect the results. Reported t-statistics are based on White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
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5.1.1.1. Lead-lag relationship of quote returns. Results based on 5-minute intervals are presented in Table 3 . In the equations explaining returns of A-and B-shares, the coefficients relating returns to their own lags are significantly negative at the 0.1% level in both the first and second sub-periods, suggesting that there is a temporary price component that tends to reverse over time.
In the first sub-period, once the signed volume is controlled for, the quote return in the A-share market predicts the quote return in the B-share market but not vice versa. In the equation explaining A-share stock returns, the coefficients for the first and second lagged B-share returns are 0.004 and 0.001 and are not significantly different from zero (t-statistics ¼ 1.67 and 0.47). In the equation explaining the B-share stock returns, the coefficients for the first and second lagged A-share returns are 0.033 and 0.022 and are significant at the 0.1% level (t-statistics ¼ 13.76 and 8.83). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that information was discovered mainly in the A-share market before Feb 19, 2001 .
The empirical results change substantially in the second sub-period (after Feb 19, 2001) , as the quote returns in both the A-and B-share markets have predictive ability for each other. In the equation explaining A-share returns, the coefficients for the first and second lagged B-share returns are 0.069 and 0.030, respectively, with t-statistics of 28.49 and 12.24, while in the equation explaining B-share stock returns, the coefficients for the first and second lagged A-share returns are 0.045 and 0.007, respectively, with t-statistics of 19.76 and 3.08. Therefore, information is discovered in both markets after Feb 19, 2001.
5.1.1.2. Effects of the signed volume on quote returns. Table 3 shows that the stock returns of A-and B-shares are significantly affected by the signed volume in their own markets. Furthermore, the signed volume impacts not only contemporaneous stock returns, but also future stock returns. In the equation explaining A-share returns, the coefficients for the contemporaneous returns and the first lagged and the second lagged A-share signed volumes are positive and strongly significant in both sub-periods. In the equation explaining the B-share returns, the coefficients for the contemporaneous returns and the first lagged and the second lagged B-share signed volumes are also significantly positive. Table 3 Relationship among standardized 5-minute returns and signed volumes of A-and B-shares
The following multivariate VAR model is estimated: The effect of the signed volume on the stock returns in the other market is, however, different between the A-and B-share markets. Before Feb 19, 2001 , while the B-share stock returns are affected by contemporaneous returns and the first lagged and the second lagged A-share signed volume, the A-share stock returns are affected by B-share signed volume only at the contemporaneous level. However, the effect of the B-share volume on the A-share stock returns becomes much stronger after Feb 19, 2001. In the equation explaining A-share returns, the coefficients of the contemporaneous returns and the first lagged B-share signed volume are 0.087 and 0.014, respectively, and are significantly different from zero (t-statistics ¼ 48. 40 and 5.93) . This confirms that the B-share market gained more information content after some domestic investors were allowed to trade in the B-share market.
5.1.1.3. Relationship among the signed volumes. We also find that the signed volumes in the A-share and B-share markets are negatively autocorrelated. This result is consistent with the negative autocorrelation of the quote returns and suggests that there is a reversal of order flows in both markets. The cross-market relationship is, however, quite different before and after Feb 19, 2001 . In the first sub-period, the coefficients of the first and second lagged B-share signed volumes in explaining A-share signed volumes are small and insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficients of the first and second lagged A-share signed volumes in explaining B-share signed volume are positive and significant. But in the second sub-period, while the A-share signed volume continues to have predictive ability for the subsequent B-share signed volume, the causality also runs in the other direction. For example, the coefficient of the first lagged B-share signed volume in explaining the B-share signed volume is 0.040 and significantly different from zero (t-statistic ¼ 13.46). 5.1.1.4. Impulse response functions to differentiate transitory and permanent effects. Figs. 1 and 2 depict the impulse response functions for determining whether the previous results on lead-lag relationships pertain to permanent (information) effects or temporary (liquidity) effects. The two graphs on the left-hand side of Fig. 1 depict the B-share cumulative return response to an A-share impulse (top graph) and A-share cumulative return response to a B-share impulse (bottom graph) before Feb 19, 2001 , and the two graphs on the right-hand side show the same information for after Feb 19, 2001 . We study two types of impulses: a one standard deviation quote return and a one standard deviation signed volume impulse. The response is measured in standard deviation units as all data are standardized before estimation. Before Feb 19, 2001, for both types of impulses, the B-share market responds more strongly to A-share impulses than vice versa. The long-term effect of an A-share signed volume impulse is, for example, a (cumulative) B-share return of 0.06 vis-a`-vis an A-share return of 0.01 on a similar B-share impulse. We find similar differences for quote return impulses. After Feb 19, 2001 , the discrepancy between the effect of the A-share market on B-share returns and the effect of the B-share market on A-share returns disappears, confirming that the two markets become less segmented. Fig. 2 depicts a cumulative signed volume response in both markets to a one standard deviation A-share quote return and a one standard deviation B-share quote return impulse. Before Feb 19, 2001, the A-share quote return has a much stronger impact on the signed volume than does the B-share quote return. A shock of one standard deviation of the A-share quote return gives a long-term effect of 0.08 for the A-share signed volume and 0.06 for the B-share signed volume. On the other hand, a shock of one standard deviation of the B-share quote return produces a negligible effect on the signed volume. These results indicate a difference between the trading strategies of domestic and foreign investors. In the A-share market, domestic investors pursue a positive feedback trading strategy, whereby they buy (sell) more subsequent to an increase (decrease) in A-share returns. On the other hand, in the B-share market, foreign investors do not react to B-share price movements. After Feb 19, 2001 , the discrepancy between the effect of the A-share and B-share quote returns on the signed volume becomes smaller. Nevertheless, there is more evidence of a positive feedback strategy in the A-share market than in the B-share market. Table 3 using the Hasbrouck (1991) VAR model extended to multiple markets. They illustrate the response of A-and B-share cumulative returns to impulses of a one standard deviation quote return or a one-standard deviation signed volume in each market. Table 3 using the Hasbrouck (1991) VAR model extended to multiple markets. They illustrate the response of A-and B-share cumulative signed volume to impulses of a one standard deviation quote return in each market. Table 2 show that the B-share market is subject to the non-trading problem, especially in the first sub-period. To circumvent this problem, we also perform the analysis based on 10-minute and 15-minute intervals. We only report the results based on the 15-minute intervals in Table 4 , because the results based on the 10-minute intervals are similar. In general, the results are similar to those based on the 5-minute intervals. Before Feb 19, 2001 , lagged returns and the lagged signed volume of the A-shares have predictive ability for B-share returns but not vice versa. After Feb 19, 2001 , the stock returns and signed volumes of the B-shares have predictive ability for A-share returns.
Robustness tests 5.1.2.1. Regression results based on 10-and 15-minute returns. Our earlier results in
5.1.2.2. Analysis based on the transaction clock of the B-share market. So far, the analysis has been based on fixed time intervals. Because the B-shares are infrequently traded so that their prices do not react to information instantaneously if no transaction takes place, the trades and price movements in the B-share market might lag behind those in the A-share market. In other words, even if A-share and B-share investors are equally informed, A-share prices would incorporate information faster and therefore lead B-share prices, simply because A-share investors trade more frequently. Thus, less active B-share trading will overestimate the influence of the A-share market on the B-share market. To circumvent this problem, we also construct time intervals of varying lengths in accordance with the transaction clock of the B-share market. In the transaction clock framework, if z Table 5 .
Compared with previous results, the impact of the signed volume of B-shares is larger. In fact, in the second sub-period, in the equation explaining the B-share returns, the coefficients for the lagged signed volume of the A-shares are not significantly positive, but in the equation explaining the A-share returns, the coefficients of the first and second lagged signed volumes of the B-shares are significantly positive. Also, in the second subperiod, the lagged signed volume of the B-shares leads the signed volume of the A-shares more than vice versa. These results are not surprising. In a transaction clock analysis when a time interval is created conditional on the occurrence of B-share trades, there is a bias favoring the informational role of the B-share market. In other words, the increased role of the B-share volume is a mechanical consequence of our transaction clock analysis. Nevertheless, based on the returns analysis, we still find that the A-share returns significantly affect the B-share returns more than vice versa in the first sub-period. Therefore, the result that the A-share market leads the price discovery remains robust. The causality, however, runs in both directions in the second sub-period. Therefore, our results that more information is discovered in the B-share market after Feb 19, 2001 remain robust.
5.1.2.3. Analysis based on a different post-liberalization sample period. Our analyses so far are based on two sub-sample periods, one before Feb 19, 2001 and one after. Results indicate that more information is discovered in the B-share market after Feb 19, 2001 , when domestic investors with foreign currency were allowed to purchase B-shares. During the transition period right after Feb 19, there was a massive convergence in prices across the two markets. According to Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2006) , the B-share discounts Table 4 Relationship among standardized 15-minute returns and signed volumes of A-and B-shares
The following multivariate VAR model is estimated:
where a i ¼ ½a Table 5 Relationship among standardized returns and signed volumes of A-and B-shares based on the transaction clock of B-share market The following multivariate VAR model is estimated:
where a i ¼ ½a ;t are the signed volumes (buyerinitiated volume minus seller-initiated volume)in the respective markets during time interval t. All return and signed volume series are standardized. We use contemporaneous term (if applicable) and six times lagged explanatory variables and report the regression coefficients for the contemporaneous and first two lags (lags 3-6 not shown to save space) and t-statistics (in italics) with * indicating significance at the 0.1 percent level. dropped from 72% to 43% after the market liberalization. As price adjustments are not instantaneous but rather gradual, the price transmission process might have been interfered with during the transition period. We therefore also examine the information transmission process after June 1, 2001, which is almost four months subsequent to the market liberalization when the price convergence should have been completed. 7 The results remain that the stock returns and the signed volumes of the B-shares have predictive ability for A-share returns after June 19, 2001 , confirming that price discovery also occurs in the B-share market.
5.1.2.4. SUR regressions to account for potential contemporaneous correlations in residuals. Our analysis so far has assumed that the residuals are uncorrelated with each other. A violation of this assumption could over-state the t-statistics in our VAR estimation. As a robustness check, we compute the correlations of residuals of the VAR model. Results are reported in Table 6 , which contains correlations of residuals for the different VAR specifications, including estimations based on 5-min intervals, 15-min intervals, and transaction clock intervals of the B-shares. The correlation patterns are generally similar for the different VAR specifications. While residual returns and residual signed volume in the A-and B-share markets are correlated, they are uncorrelated among themselves. Furthermore, the correlations are higher after (1)-(4) are contemporaneously correlated, we therefore also estimate the equations using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and find that the results are robust. Feb 19, 2001 , there is no evidence of cointegration of the A-share and B-share price series of the 5-and 15-minute intervals. However, we do find cointegration for the daily price series after the B-share market was opened to domestic investors on Feb 19, 2001 . The augmented Dickey-Fuller results, reported in Table 7 , show that only for the daily frequency after Feb 19 are the price differentials stationary for the majority of stocks (55 out of 76). We follow Maddala and Wu (1999) and summarize the cross-sectional test results in a joint test based on stock-specific p-values. This test only rejects the unit root (and thus establishes cointegration) for the daily series after Feb 19. We interpret the lack of cointegration prior to Feb 19 as empirical support for the markets being perfectly segmented.
Hasbrouck (1995) information shares
Before
As we only have cointegration for daily prices after Feb 19, 2001, we can estimate the information shares for these price series. The Hasbrouck information shares show that despite strong intraday information spillovers from the B-shares to the A-shares and vice versa after Feb 19, 2001 , the A-shares continue to dominate price discovery at the daily Table 6 Covariance and correlation matrix of VAR model residuals
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We present the covariance and correlation matrix of the residuals estimated from the following VAR model:
where a i ¼ ½a Covariance of residues Correlation of residues Covariance of residues Correlation of residues 
The null hypothesis is H 0i : r i ¼ 0 (no cointegration) and the alternative hypothesis is H 1i : r i o0. We report the number of tests that reject the null at a 5% significance level. We further do a joint test for the cross-section (N ¼ 76) using the Fisher test developed in Maddala and Wu (1999) . The test statistic is based on the cross-section of p-values:
The L statistic has a w 2 distribution with 2N degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. If the independence assumption is violated, an asymptotic test can be constructed:
The limiting distribution of theL statistic is standard normal. The test is one-sided and rejects for large values ofL. level. Fig. 3 presents the stock-specific lower and upper bound on the A-market information share. We interpret the lower bound as information uniquely assigned to the A-share market, the difference between the lower and upper bound as information arriving at both markets simultaneously, and 100% minus the upper bound as information uniquely assigned to the B-share market. We find that, on average, 90.7% of the information is uniquely assigned to the A-market, 8.1% to both markets, and 1.2% to the B-share market. Although we find considerable cross-sectional variation, the A-share market always contributes more than half of the information, whereas the B-share market never contributes more than 10%.
Analysis based on large order imbalance events
This section compares the price impact of large order imbalance events in the A-and B-share markets before and after Feb 19, 2001 . This is to determine if previous results are robust during unusual periods. For each of the stocks listed on both the A-and B-share Table 7 ). The methodology establishes upper and lower bounds for these information shares. We interpret the lower bound as information uniquely attributable to the A-share market. The differential between the lower and upper bound indicates the amount of information that arrives at both markets simultaneously and can, therefore, not be assigned to either market. The difference between the upper bound and 100% is uniquely attributable to the B-share market.
markets on either the SHSE or the SZSE, we select ten 5-min intervals for the largest netbuy volume (positive signed volume) and another ten intervals for the largest net-sell volume (negative signed volume) in the A-and B-share markets. For each of the selected events, we examine the stock returns from the previous tenth (À10) to the subsequent tenth (+10) interval surrounding the event. We then calculate the mean-adjusted returns by subtracting from the return for a given interval the sample average return for that interval on that day of the returns. Panel A of Table 8 presents results based on the order imbalance events in the A-share market. To save space, only mean-adjusted returns for intervals À1, 0 1 and cumulative adjusted returns (CAR) over successive intervals are reported. We first discuss the results before Feb 19, 2001 . First, the A-share order imbalance exerts a strong and significant price impact on the A-share stock returns. During the interval 0, the A-shares have a mean-adjusted return of 1.857% for buy imbalances and À1.139% for sell imbalances. There are signs that price effects occur even during the early intervals. The mean-adjusted return during the interval (À10, À1) is 0.576% for buy imbalances but much smaller for sell imbalances. Overall, the cumulative price impacts are much bigger for buy imbalances than for sell imbalances. During the interval (À10, 10), the cumulative mean-adjusted returns are 1.344% (t-statistic ¼ 11.38) for buy imbalances and À0.032% (t-statistic ¼ À0.028) for sell imbalances. For convenience, in the rest of our discussion, we refer to the price reaction during the interval 0 as the immediate price impact and the price reaction during the interval (À10, 10) as the permanent price impact. The impacts of the A-share buy and sell imbalances on the B-share returns are small though significant. The immediate price impacts on the B-shares are 0.164% for buy imbalances and À0.077% for sell imbalances. The permanent price impacts on the B-shares are 0.249% (t-statistic ¼ 2.1) for buy imbalances and À0.184% (t-statistic ¼ À1.58) for sell imbalances. After Feb 19, 2001 , the order imbalances of the A-shares continue to have strong price impacts on both the A-and B-shares.
Panel B presents the price impacts of the B-shares. In the period before Feb 19, 2001, while the B-share order imbalances have significant price impacts on the B-shares, they have small and insignificant price impacts on the A-shares. For example, the immediate price impact on the A-shares is 0.007% conditional on the B-share buy imbalance and À0.025% conditional on the B-share sell imbalance. Both of these price impacts are statistically insignificant. After Feb 19, 2001 , the impact of the B-share order imbalance on the A-share returns is much stronger. Conditional on the B-share buy imbalances, the immediate price impact on the A-share returns is 0.405% while the cumulative price impact is 1.164%. Conditional on the B-share sell imbalances, the immediate price impact on the A-share returns is À0.334% while the cumulative price impact is 0.128%. Therefore, the results are consistent with those in previous sections that an abnormal volume in B-shares contains more information after Feb 19, 2001.
Conclusion
We employ the perfect market segmentation setting in China's stock market to examine whether foreign investors are at an informational disadvantage relative to domestic investors. Before Feb 19, 2001 , all domestic investors traded only in the A-share market while all foreign investors traded only in the B-share market. Results show that the signed volume of the A-share market has strong predictive ability for A-and B-share quote Table 8 Intraday returns around 5-minute intervals of large order-imbalance events Order imbalances (buyer-initiated volume minus seller-initiated volume) in the A-and B-share markets are calculated stock by stock and normalized by total volume for the stock on a particular day. The samples comprise ten intervals with the largest normalized buy and sell order-imbalances selected for each stock. For the meanadjusted return, we use the means by day of week and by time of day. The CAR(À10, À1), CAR(0,+1), CAR(0, +10), and CAR(+1,+10) are the cumulative returns from interval À10 to À1, from 0 to +1, from 0 to +10, and from +1 to +10 (temporary effect), respectively, and the t-statistics are reported in italics. ** Indicates significance at the 1% level, * at the 5% level. Panel A is based on the largest 10 normalized order-imbalance events in the A-share market, while Panel B is based on such events in the B-share market. returns, while the signed volume of the B-share market has little predictive ability for the A-share quote return. Furthermore, while the A-share quote revision has predictive ability for the B-share quote revision, the B-share quote revision has no predictive ability for the A-share quote revision. Therefore, the trades and quote revisions in the A-share market contained more information than those in the B-share market, suggesting that domestic investors have more information than do foreign investors. After Feb 19, 2001 , when domestic investors with foreign currency holdings are allowed to participate in the B-share market, the B-share quote revisions significantly affect the A-share quote revisions and the B-share signed volume affects both the A-share signed volume and the quote revisions. This gives further support to the hypothesis that domestic investors are more informed than are foreign investors. Because some domestic investors have been allowed to trade in the B-share market since Feb 19, 2001 , the trades and quote revisions in the B-share market also contain information. Aggregating to a daily level, we find that in spite of the intraday bidirectional causality after Feb 19, 2001, the A-share market continues to dominate price discovery as, across all the stocks, its Hasbrouck (1995) information share always exceeds 50%, against a less than 10% information share for the B-share market. This provides evidence that domestic investors either have more private information or trade on the information faster than do foreign investors.
We end our paper with a couple of notes. First, one should be cautious in interpreting our evidence that A-share returns leading B-share returns does not necessarily imply that domestic investors are better informed than foreign investors. Since trading activity in the B-share market is much thinner than in the A-share market, our results could be driven by strategic trading by informed investors who, potentially, trade slower in the B-share market to reduce the market impact. In other words, foreign investors are not necessarily less informed, but they simply choose to act on their information more slowly. While we do not rule out this explanation, we should point out that informed foreign investors cannot be too ''patient'' with their trades as the A-and B-share markets are not isolated in terms of information transmission. As our results also show, both the quote return and the signed volume in the B-share market react to the A-share price movement, and therefore informed foreign investors should feel pressure to trade their information before it is all incorporated into B-share prices.
Despite our results that price discovery takes place predominantly in the A-share market, we would like to point out that foreign investors do not necessarily face an informational disadvantage relative to domestic investors, especially since they do not trade directly with domestic investors (at least before Feb 19, 2001). They would not be worse off if they were simply passive buy-and-hold investors who could minimize the adverse selection cost of trading with better informed investors. In that regard, foreign investors who pursue a longterm buy-and-hold strategy might not earn lower returns than domestic investors earn. If data on trading accounts of domestic and foreign investors become available, one could compare their profits directly, as this would shed light on the information disadvantage of one group of investors relative to the other. We leave this for future work.
